CVE-2020-24587

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that all fragments of a frame are encrypted under the same key. An adversary can abuse this to decrypt selected fragments when another device sends fragmented frames an...

CVE-2020-24588

The 802.11 standard that underpins Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA, WPA2, and WPA3) and Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) doesn't require that the A-MSDU flag in the plaintext QoS header field is authenticated. Against devices that support receiving non-SSP A-MSDU frames (which is mandatory as part of 802...

CVE-2020-26141

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The Wi-Fi implementation does not verify the Message Integrity Check (authenticity) of fragmented TKIP frames. An adversary can abuse this to inject and possibly decrypt packets in WPA or WPA2 networks that support the ...

CVE-2020-26139

An issue was discovered in the kernel in NetBSD 7.1. An Access Point (AP) forwards EAPOL frames to other clients even though the sender has not yet successfully authenticated to the AP. This might be abused in projected Wi-Fi networks to launch denial-of-service attacks against connected clients an...

CVE-2020-26140

An issue was discovered in the ALFA Windows 10 driver 6.1316.1209 for AWUS036H. The WEP, WPA, WPA2, and WPA3 implementations accept plaintext frames in a protected Wi-Fi network. An adversary can abuse this to inject arbitrary data frames independent of the network configuration.

CVE-2021-34711

A vulnerability in the debug shell of Cisco IP Phone software could allow an authenticated, local attacker to read any file on the device file system. This vulnerability is due to insufficient input validation. An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by providing crafted input to a debug shell...

CVE-2021-33478

The TrustZone implementation in certain Broadcom MediaxChange firmware could allow an unauthenticated, physically proximate attacker to achieve arbitrary code execution in the TrustZone Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) of an affected device. This, for example, affects certain Cisco IP Phone and ...